

International War & Terrorism

Lecture Notes

Outline prepared and written by:

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Youtube Playlist Link:

http://www.youtube.com/view_play_list?p=B5FFE60CFDB74A00

“Terrorism, and International Violence” Martha Crenshaw
Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. 2000. University of Michigan Press. Pg., 3-24.

§1.1

Motivating factors for Terrorism:

1. Powerful states constitute attractive targets (p. 4)
2. Weaker states are easily infiltrated (p. 9).
3. Preexisting sentiments toward noncooperation exist with a particular region (p. 11).

Three Problems in defining “Terrorism”

1. Objectivity is complicated by the pejorative nature of the term.¹ (p. 5)
2. The concept of terrorism is not tied to any specific ideology (p. 6).
3. understanding what terrorism is or why it occurs does not imply an ability to treat or curb the occurrence of terrorism² (p. 7).

¹ Crenshaw, M., Ed. (1994). *Organized Disorder: Terrorism, Politics and Society*. The Democratic Imagination and the Social Science Persuasion. New Brunswick, Transaction Press.

Four General Forms of Terrorism:

1. Domestic terrorism: terrorist actions involving the citizens or territory of one's own country.
2. International terrorism: terrorist "actions involving the citizens or territory of more than one country" (p. 7).
3. Bargaining dependent terrorism: an approach to terrorism wherein the perpetrators use human life, resources and anything of value to extort those in power to meet their demands. E.g., kidnappings, hijackings, seizures.
4. Bargaining independent terrorism: an approach to terrorism wherein perpetrators do not seek to bargain with those in power, but use violence as a tool in the perpetration of fear. E.g., bombings, mass killings, mass poisoning.

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- Note, the difference between bargaining dependent and bargaining independent terrorism is not contingent on the nature of the terrorist attack but on the *intent* to act.

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- For example, a hijacking can be considered bargaining dependent if the hostages are to be used as collateral in seeking some end. However, as in the case of 9-11 a hijacking can be considered a form of bargaining independent terrorism since there was never any intent on hostage release.

² Ross, J. I. (1994). "The Psychological Causes of Oppressional Political Terrorism: Toward an Integration of Findings." International Journal of Group Tensions **24**: 157-185.

Two Effects in Target Selection:

1. **Displacement Effect:**³ antiterrorist countermeasures by one state will increase the vulnerability of another. (p. 12).
2. **Substitution Effect:**⁴ “when technologies and or policies are applied to prevent terrorist events, terrorists transfer their efforts to new but related efforts.”
 - a. e.g., the installation of metal detectors will lead to a decrease in airplane hijackings, but will also lead to an increase in kidnappings and assassinations.

3 Terrorist Attack Strategies:

- Bombings account for half of all terrorist attacks.⁵
- Previous attacks are good indications for future attacks.⁶
- Manipulation of Media fosters support.⁷

Super and catastrophic terrorism: refers to terrorist acts wherein Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are used in a terrorist attack or serve as the weapons of intended use.⁸

Pros and Cons to Hostage Negotiations:

Cons:

Negotiations “confer legitimacy” (p. 18).

Negotiations and concessions make a government vulnerable to future terrorist attacks and demands. (p. 18).

³ Todd Sandler, H. E. L. (1988). "The Calculus of Dissent: An Analysis of Terrorists' Choice of Targets." *Synthese* **76**: 245-261.

⁴ Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, Joe Cauley (1990). "Un Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation." *Terrorism and Political Violence* **2**: 83-105.

⁵ Bruce Hoffman, Dennis A. Pluchinsky, David C. Rapoport (1997). "Terrorists and Claiming Credit: The Debate." *Terrorism and Political Violence* **9**: 1-19.

⁶ Ross, J. I. (1992). "Attacking Terrorist Attacks: INitial Tests of the Contagion between Domestic and International Terrorism in Canada." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* **1**: 163-182.

⁷ Nacos, B. L. (1994). *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing*. New York, Columbia University Press.

⁸ For example, the Aum Shinrikyo poison gass attack in Tokyo.

Pros:

1. There is no statistically verifiable data suggesting that negotiations result in greater vulnerability.
2. Compromise and negotiation are not to be confused with concession. Thus, governments have the ability to restrict their involvement.

“Governments also tended to compromise or negotiate rather than comply directly” (p. 18)

International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism:

- International cooperation is an integral part of counterterrorism.
- However, **Free riding** is a problem from combating terrorism. (p., 19).

Difficulties with International Cooperation:

Large Number of actors

International cooperation within the Group of Seven (G-7) and the European Union (EU) contribute to combating Terrorism.⁹

In operation “El Dorado Canyon” (1986) under President Ronald Reagan, military force was used in the bombing of Libya rather than “coercive instruments” (p., 20).

- This resulted, in part, from a lack of international cooperation.

⁹ “The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which established a single unified market, provided for extensive cooperation in matters of security against terrorism” (p., 19).

Limits of Coercion:

- Ineffective against transnational threats
- Better equipped against state-oriented threats.
- Difficulty in identifying nonstate actors.
- Inherent disorganization of nonstate actors
- Manipulation of public opinion.

The New Face of Terrorism:

- “lacks hierarchical organization”
- Maintain clear political goals
- Influence over public opinion.¹⁰
- [Terrorism with a Human Face]

Challenges to the Concept of Terrorism:

- Terrorism as concept is too general.¹¹
- Evoking “terrorism” serves as a refusal to engage in political discourse.¹²
- “Terrorism” is a distraction from real international disorder and imbalances.¹³

Effects of Terrorism on International Conflict Resolution:

- Destabilizes International Cooperation
- Destabilizes Interstate Security
- Has the potential to expand regional (intrastate conflict) into International (interstate conflict).
- “Makes it difficult to distinguish between state and nonstate actors” (p., 23).

¹⁰ Nacos, B. L. (1994). Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing. New York, Columbia University Press.

¹¹ Guelke, A. (1995). The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System. London, I.B. Tauris.

¹² Joseba Zulaika, W. A. D. (1996). Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism. New York, Routledge.

¹³ Derian, J. D. (1992). Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War. Cambridge, Blackwell.

§1.2

“Identity and International Conflict” Manus I. Midlarsky
Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. 2000. University of Michigan Press. Pg., 25-58

Three Forms of Ethnopolitical Conflict

1. Structural Systemic Conflict:
 - a. Power, Alliance, Resource Appropriation
2. Dyadic Conflict:
 - a. Territorial contingencies, geographic proximity, Primordialism
3. Unit-Level Conflict:
 - a. Top Down, Elite-generated conflict

Definitions:

1. International conflict: “conflict up to and including violence between states” (p. 25).
2. Identity: “to grasp the nature and power of ethnic nationalism today, one must focus primarily on the collective level of identity and community. The particular collective cultural identity of concern here is the *ethnie*, or ethnic community”¹⁴
3. Relative Security: The assessment of state security based on recent events in national history.

6 Elements of Collective Identity:


1. Genetic identity is not at stake
2. *Collective identity* refers to stories passed from generation to generation, (suggests the mutability of identity)¹⁵
3. Language
4. Territorial attachments / descendents from common land, region.
5. Ethnic Community: exists denotatively
 - a. Contingent on: literacy, transportation, communication
6. Religion

¹⁴ Smith, A. D. (1993). The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. M. E. Brown. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Clifford, J. (1988). The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Ethnic Identity and Security Dilemmas:

1. Ethnic rivalries typically result in both groups vying for power.¹⁶
2. **Aggravating factor**: an inability to distinguish between offensive and defensive weaponry. ([Dual use technologies](#) in the A.Q. Khan Network)
3. **The Parable of the Tribes**:¹⁷



¹⁶ Posen, B. R. (1993). "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." *Survival* 35: 27-47.

¹⁷ Schmookler, Andrew. B. (1984). *The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Conditions for State Insecurity

1. State collapse
 2. Fear of War
 3. Recent Defeat During War
 4. Major Act of War (e.g., destruction of the Nazi State)
-

“A severe external threat can act to unify a society at least temporarily as long as the threat is still manifest.¹⁸ But when it diminishes or disappears, then muted antagonisms or grievances can surface abruptly, (p. 31).”

A Model of Systemic War:¹⁹

1. Multipolarity²⁰ → Resource Inequality
2. Resource Inequality → Alliance Formation
3. Alliance Formation → Overlap in Conflict Structures
4. **Overlap in Conflict Structures**²¹ → Change in the balance of power
5. Change in the balance of power → Systemic War

Explanation

1. As resource scarcity ↑, in a multipolar setting, inequality in resource distribution ↑.
2. As inequality in resource distribution ↑, less-favored actors seek allies to attain resources
3. In gaining allies the possibility for overlap in conflict structures ↑ (e.g., Serb-Muslim / Serbo-Croatian). “*when alliance formation...facilitates the overlap of conflict structures, the conflict process enters the irreversible stage*” (p. 38)

¹⁸ Coser, Lewis. (1956). The Function of Social CONflict. New York, The Free Press., Simmel, G. (1955). Conflict. New York, The Free Press.

¹⁹ Midlarsky, M. I. (1988). "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence." American Political Science Review **82**: 491-509.

²⁰ States with roughly equal power

²¹ Path to war becomes inevitable at this point:

Non-Externalized Conflict:

1. Systemic Wars
 - a. Regional Systemic Conflict
 - i. Civil Wars
2. The Absence of a Multipolar System
 - a. No incentive to intervene

The Rwanda Genocide as Influenced by the Bosnian Model:

1. Influenced by European political behavior
2. Recognition of the success of the Bosnian genocide. “it appear[ed] that genocidal activities could be accomplished without serious external constraint.” (p. 41).
3. Mass rape was implemented as a tactic of humiliation, which was previously used during the beginning of the Bosnian genocide²²
4. The genocide did not “require a large-scale societal awareness of external events” (p. 41). Top-Down. Small number of orchestrators and a large number of perpetrators.
5. Genocidal behavior in one location can influence behavior in another location in a very short amount of time.
6. Genocide occurred as a consequence of perceived threat.

Dyadic Effects

Democratic Peace Theory

1. Democracy is different from democratization. *Democracy* is a “fully realized political condition” and *democratization* is “an ongoing process” (p. 44).
2. **Argument**: Democracies do not wage war against each other
3. According to some, democratization, however, is a principle source of ethnopolitical conflict.²³
4. Others argue that nationalism and democratization are compatible.²⁴

²² Crossette, B. (1998). Violation: An Old Scourge of War Becomes its Latest Crime. *New York Times*: 1, 6.

²³ Gurr, T. R. (1994). "Peoples against State: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System." *International Studies Quarterly* **38**: 347-377.

²⁴ Nodia, G. (1994). *Nationalism and Democracy. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy*. M. F. P. Larry Diamond. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Conditions to be Avoided During Democratization

1. “identification of the regime with a specific ethnic group”
2. “reference to historical grievances”
3. “manipulation of the ethnic mix”
4. Conflating democracy and liberal democracy.
 - a. Democracy in the form of voting rights
 - b. Liberal Democracy in the form of freedom of speech, press, religion.

Primordialism:

- Precondition for ethnic strife.
- [Read Definition, (p. 47)].
- Intrastate instability will serve to ignite primordial tensions between intrastate groups.

Unit Level

The Unit Level Explanation for Ethnic Strife:

1. Consequence of “elite-generate” strife, (p. 49).
2. Prior to elite interference intermarriage is common
3. Ethnic violence becomes a *consequence* of elite interference

§1.3

“Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict”

Jack S. Levy

Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. 2000. University of Michigan Press.

Pg., 193-221.

Prospect Theory and International Relations:

1. Developed by Kahneman and Tversky.²⁵
2. An **inductive** theoretical process.


²⁵ Daniel Kahneman, A. T. (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47: 263-291.

3. Descriptive “theory of risky choice” (p. 194).
4. A form of behavioral decision theory.
 - a. The specific behaviors pertain to decision making under risk.
5. Prospect theory is built on the conception of *reference dependence*.
 - a. Emphasizes asset changes rather than asset levels. [plus or minus with respect to some reference point]
 - b. Asset changes pertain to the *gains* and *losses*.
 - c. A single reference point implies a single choice/decision


[prospect theory] is based on the idea that people evaluate gains or losses...from some neutral or status quo point, an assumption consistent with the adaptation-level findings that occur not just in perception but in virtually all experience. That is, *we adapt to a constant level of virtually any psychological dimension* and find it to be neutral. In a similar way, we adapt to the reduced light in a movie theater when we enter it—finding it not particularly dark after a few seconds—and then readapt to the much brighter light outside when we leave the theater—finding it not to be unusually bright after a few seconds. But since choice varies by framing it as a gain or a loss, it cannot reveal underlying preferences.’ Dawes (2001, p. 195)²⁶

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6. People respond differently to gains and losses, “they *overvalue* losses relative to comparable gains” (p. 194).\

²⁶ Dawes, Robyn M., 2001. Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo-Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.



I created this image as an example. Statistics are for educational purposes only



****I created this image as an example. Statistics are for educational purposes only****

Prospect Theory Findings:

1. People value things they have more than things they don't
2. It is more difficult to lose something than it is to gain something:
endowment effect.
3. *Risk orientation*: risk averse with respect to gain, risk seeking with respect to losses. ([Prisoner's Dilemma](#))
4. *Framing effect*: the change in choice as a consequence of the change in frame.
5. ***Reference point is not always fixed.
6. *Instant endowment effect*: reference point reorientation after gains occurs faster than losses. "renormalization"
[[Gasset e.g., "The Height of Times" vs. "The Golden Era"](#)]

"after a series of losses, however, individuals will not adjust to the new situation but rather continue to frame around the old reference point. They will perceive any chance of "improving" [relatively speaking] their position to a point that still falls short of the original reference point as a loss, and they will engage in risk-seeking behavior to eliminate those losses and return to the reference point" (p. 197). [[Detailed Explanation](#)]

Two Phases in Prospect Theory:

1. *The Editing Phase*:
 - a. Assessment of options, outcomes, and valuations
2. *The Evaluation Phase*:
 - a. Combination of value of possible outcomes with weight probabilities [percentages] [weight on RA for gains and RS for losses] AKA "*probability weighting function*"

Problems in Applying Prospect Theory (PT) to IR:

1. PT applies to individual / IR is concerned with nations
2. Difficulty in explaining national renormalization [me]
3. Collective risk assessment is different from individual risk assessment

State-Level Implications:

1. State attempt to preserve the status quo. ([See political obstructionism](#))

2. Territorial defense receives *greater weight* than territorial acquisition.²⁷
3. **Defensive Realism**: “states maximize security by aiming to preserve the status quo in the international system.” (p. 201).
4. “political candidates are are more concerned to avoid alienating key constituents than strengthening support among those groups.”
Aside
5. Framing is **essential** in attain public support [*explain in detail*]
 - a. RA vs RS
6. Frames above the status quo define the status quo as a loss.
 - a. National education expenditure [e.g.]
7. Frames below the status quo define the status quo as a gain
 - a. Pre Social Security e.g.
8. Decline in relative power is typically framed as a loss with a particular reference point in the past as the goal from power. Incremental increases in power are avoided for a return to the **original reference point**.
9. (p. 206) ¶2.
10. In *dyadic bargaining* “concession aversion” leads to “a greater tendency on both sides to risk the consequences of a nonagreement or deadlock, and hence a lower probability of a negotiated agreement” (p. 209).

§1.4

CPE1704TKS: War-Game-Theoretics and Game Tree Construction

Constructing a Basic Game Tree:

1. Game trees are visual representations of decision based non-cooperative games [DBNG].
2. War games can be assessed in terms of a [DBNG]

²⁷ Ross, Dennis. (1984). Risk Aversion in Soviet Decisionmaking. Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security. W. P. Jiri Valenta. London, Allen and Unwin.

3. The Game tree is an atemporal representation of all the outcomes of the game.
4. Each decision in a war game involves the escalation or de-escalation of conflict.
5. In this basic game 2 decisions are required to reach an outcome
6. Outcomes can be ranked in order of maximal to minimal number of casualties.


Assumptions of the War Game and Game Tree:

1. Actors are rational
2. Actors seek to minimize their total number of casualties
3. No actor knows the decision of the other actors in the game
4. Decisions are irreversible.

Identifying Parts of the Game Tree:

1. *Decision nodes*: individual point of decisions
2. *Moves*: options from nodes
 - a. Moves are exclusively disjunctive: $F(x) \sim (Ax \ \& \ Bx)$
3. *Outcomes* AKA terminal nodes: consequences
4. *Information set*: a collection of decision nodes and moves

Hypothetical Game Tree for Conflict Escalation



Analysis of Non-Cooperative Conflict Escalation War Game:

1. Assess Outcomes:
 - a. P: Punishment = Maximum casualties for both sides
 - b. T: Temptation = Maximum enemy casualties
 - c. S: Sucker = Maximum allied casualties
 - d. R: Reward = Peace / (minimal no casualties)
2. In non-cooperation / (exclusive disjunction)
 - a. Attaining Peace requires de-escalation
 - b. But not knowing the enemies decision, de-escalation leads to the worst possible outcome, being a sucker, and the highest allied casualties.
 - c. Escalating, however, leads to the worst, overall possible outcome, punishment and the greatest number of casualties.

War Game Strategies and Assessment:

1. Begin with KK
2. Infer UK as possibilities in the game
 - a. [demonstrate]
3. Weight outcomes and list them in order of preference
4. Utilize those “moves” that lead to the:
 - a. Best
 - b. The most practical goals.
5. Recognize that the tree is atemporal so moves can be executed simultaneously.

§1.5.1

“The Ongoing Game-Theoretic Revolution”

James D. Morrow

Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. 2000. University of Michigan Press.

Pg., 164-192.

“Game theory provides a flexible and useful tool to create formal models of the strategic interaction present in theories of war” (p. 164). -

Non-cooperative Game Theory:

1. “Mathematical theory of strategic interactions” (p. 165).
2. Part of Decision theory
3. Actions are classified as “perfect” if they serve the best interest of the actor.
4. Perfection is a test for credibility.
 - a. If we know E is the best move for State A, but it chooses D the action is imperfect and it undermines State A’s *commitment* to winning the game. [explain]

Deterrence Theory:²⁸

1. Threats can deescalate an escalation of conflict. [E-D in DBNG]

Game Solutions:

1. Games are solved by reaching equilibrium
 - a. Not the best of all possible states
 - b. The Best possible state
 - i. E.g., Temptation (best possible) rather than Reward (best of *all possible*)
2. Does not suggest that the outcomes are balanced.

On the Role of Commitment in Game Theory:

Commitment refers (generally) to the relationship between a states posturing and the likelihood that the state will act in a predictable fashion.

3 Complications in Analyzing State Commitment:


1. Commitment is compromised if other states don’t acknowledge threats. [failure to follow through with threat]
2. Commitment is compromised in power transition wherein the new regime fails to ensure the old regime that it will not completely destroy the political status quo.

²⁸ Kaufman, W. (1956). The Requirement of Deterrence. Military Policy and National Security. W. Kaufman. Princeton, Princeton University Press.


3. “Perfection allows us to test the credibility of commitment within a game” (p., 167).

On the Role of Limited Information in Game Theory:

1. Information is limited if parties to the conflict have limited information.
2. Persuasion, signaling and bluffing are all representative features of limited information (p. 167).
3. Information that is only accessible to the particular actor is identified as private information.
4. Private information is *inferred* from actions.



The information is *obviously* private. We know that he is not going to use this money to pay for karate lessons. What he will use this money for can only be inferred from his actions after he receives the money.



Application of Perfection and Private Information in a Game:

1. If we *know*, prior to the start of the game, that the second party knows that we (as party 1) typically [historically] don't bluff, and we have superior military capabilities, then if we say that we are going to engage them if xyz occurs, then when xyz occurs our actions will be perfect if we engage them. [Reinforced commitment] "**our hand was forced**"
2. In instance where temporal factors are observable, if we see party 2 escalating the conflict [2E prior to 1 node] despite their full recognition of our superior military capabilities, then we *must recognize* that there is some private information, which they feel **justifies** their escalation of the conflict.
 - a. Either they have acquired or intend on using secret weapons.
 - b. And/ Or it is the last desperate attempt of a failing regime to preserve power. [E.g., Power Transition Theory]

Use of Intelligence in Strategic Planning: [Critical Thinking]

1. Given the following information determine the most likely course of engagement. Assume you are the first party. (1) 2's power is being challenged and power transition is highly possible. (2) 2 is militarily more well equipped than you and poses a significant

threat. (3) You have the private knowledge that the opposition is sympathetic to your cause. (4) You have the means to privately equip the opposition. Based on this information do you escalate or deescalate the conflict? Note: be sure to consider *all* the information.

§1.5.2

Continued

"The Ongoing Game-Theoretic Revolution"

James D. Morrow

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
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Balance of Power and Coalition Formation:

Two Concepts of Stability:


1. System Stability
 - a. "No states are eliminated from the system" (p., 178).
 - b. All States are [potentially secure]
2. Resource Stability:
 - a. Resources are never transferred from one state to another.

Resource and System Stability in a Two-State System:




Cannot have System Stability *only* in a two state system [explain].
A two state system cannot be system stable *only*, impossible.

Resource and System Stability in a Three-State System:



System Stability *Only* in a Three State System:

Not resource stable



Resource and System Stability in More than Three-State System:

One state has exactly $\frac{1}{2}$ the resources

E.g., 150, 100, 30, 20

System Stability *Only* in More than Three-State System:

Not resource stable

“Any division where all states are essential” (p. 181).

All states are essential states. Resources can be xfered to guarantee security: E.g., 120, 80, 60, 40 (-30, +30)

Given the following distribution of resources determine which states are essential and which are inessential. Note: Assume that maximum resources = 300. Determine whether the system is (1) Resource and System stable, (2) system stable only, (3) or unstable.

1. (82, 73, 90, 55)²⁹
2. (110, 88, 51, 51)³⁰
3. (149, 149, 2)³¹
4. (150, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30)³²
5. (21, 66, 63, 150)³³

§1.6

 “New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses”³⁴

Joshua Sinai

Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction

Pg., 31-50.

Can Terrorism Studies Constitute a Scientific Discipline?

- Terrorism studies must be an interdisciplinary study.
- “Terrorism is a tactic of warfare” (p. 32).
 - Part of a military science.
- However, because of the clandestine nature of terrorism it “can never achieve the capability of a true science” (p. 32).

Defining Terrorism:

- According to the US Department of state:
 Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656f(a) as follows:
 (1) the term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;
 (2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and
 (3) the term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.³⁵

²⁹ Potentially unstable, 55 faces elimination from the system, 55 is inessential

³⁰ System stable only, all states are essential

³¹ System Stable only, all states are essential

³² System and resource stable, all states are essential

³³ System and resource stable, all states are essential

³⁴ Sinai, J. (2007). New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses. Mapping Terrorism Research : State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction. M. Ranstorp. New York Taylor & Francis Routledge.

Three Group and Warfare Typologies:

Three Types of Warfare for Terrorist Organizations:

1. Conventional Low Impact: (CLI): conventional means are used to cause *few casualties*.³⁶
2. Conventional High Impact: (CHI): conventional means are used to cause *catastrophic casualties*.³⁷
3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear: (CBRN) “unconventional” means are used to inflict mass casualties.

Origins of Terrorism:

- Usually a consequence of multiple factors
 - Refutation of monocausal origin.
- Cause of terrorism are not static, they are continuously changing

Theoretical Causes of Terrorism:

- Structural Causes:
 - Social factors affecting the terrorist organization
 - Government as key “perceived” agitator
- Relative Deprivation:³⁸
 - Frustration and anger are directed toward the object of the group’s anger.
- Absolute Deprivation:
 - Once a group’s basic necessities cannot be met, e.g., food, water, shelter, poverty, starvation...the group directs its aggression toward the “perceived” cause of their deprivation.

Three Levels of Terrorist Origination Appeal:

1. Societal: social injustices and structural violence serve as a springboard for terrorism

³⁵ Counterterrorism, O. o. t. C. f. (2007). "Country Reports on Terrorism." Retrieved 3-31-2011, 2011, from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82726.htm>


³⁶ Driving a car through the glass window of an airport.

³⁷ Hijacking a plane and crashing it into the Twin Towers.

³⁸ Gurr, Ted Robert, (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

2. **Group**: Terrorist leaders emerge as facilitators of the terrorist organization
3. **Individual**: impressionable minds are attracted to terrorist organization because, they are “*formulated in clear-cut, definitive terms*” (p., 37). [the power of precise and easily digestible speech, keep it simple stupid].

Radicalization, Recruitment and Mobilization:



Modernization as a Cause for Joining a Terrorist Organization:

- Produces “socioeconomic and political dislocations in society” (p. 39).
- Parties to the conflict are generally “revivalists” & “modernists”
 - Revivalists espouse traditional ideological beliefs
 - Modernists threaten these traditional ideologies.

Social Network Analysis:

- Identification of frequencies of interaction between individuals
- Emphasis placed on social bonds (marriage, family etc) as a tool for recruitment.

Terrorist Mobilization

1. Tactical countermeasures can be used as an opportunity to mobilize supporters and sympathizers.

2. Most provoke target into “pursuing repressive strategies.”³⁹
3. The function of the organization is to spur mobilization for the explicit purpose of radicalizing sympathizers and supporters.⁴⁰

First, counterterror campaigns in which a government appears **insensitive to the suffering** of the aggrieved population will result in **increased mobilization** in support of the extremists. Second, governments that are concerned with the welfare of the population, but which either lack the technology, or find themselves in situations where it is impossible, to engage in even discriminating counterterror without nonetheless imposing serious damage on the population...are also likely to face an increasingly radical aggrieved population. **Conversely, when governments are concerned with the welfare of the aggrieved population and can engage in counterterror that imposes relatively low levels of damage, then conflict can backfire on an extremist terrorist vanguard, decreasing radicalization and increasing support for the moderates.** Finally, when both hard-line and soft-line governments find negotiation unpalatable, learning that the government is soft-line does not particularly sway the aggrieved population. Consequently, the negative effects on the economy of counterterror are likely to outweigh the positive effects of learning that the government is soft-line, leading to an increase in support for the extremists.⁴¹

³⁹ Mesquita, E. B. d. and E. S. Dickson (2007). "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* **51**(2): 364-381.

⁴⁰ DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁴¹ Mesquita, E. B. d. and E. S. Dickson (2007), p. 374.